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Abstract
A computationally secure noised based cipher system is proposed. The ad-
vantage of this cipher system is that it operates above noise level. Therefore
computationally secure communication can be done when error correction code
fails. Another feature of this system is that minimum number of exhaustive key
search can be made fixed.
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All the popular classical cipher systems [1-2] are computationally secure. As computational security
is not mathematically proven, it does not always satisfy all. Nevertheless computational secure
systems are used when ’cover time’ is not long. But these cryptosystem can not be used if the
classical communication system becomes highly corrupted which classical error correcting code
cannot correct. We shall see, the solution of the above problem lies in the noise itself. Manipulating
noise a simple cipher system is presented. The cipher system works on the same coding and
decoding technique developed for quantum cryptography [3].
In our coding decoding procedure, two different sequences of states represent two bit values.
The information regarding the two sequences are shared between the legitimate users. Sender
repeatedly and randomly uses the two sequences to produce an arbitrarily long string of bits (i.e.
the key) and receiver recovers the bit values from the shared information.
Firstly we shall describe the error introduction strategy in a simple classical system. The basic
idea behind this protocol is that a sequence of one type of element will be corrupted in two different
ways to represent two bit values. This is equivalent to choosing two sequences for two bit values.
Suppose the sequence is
S = {1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ........}. This sequence can be represented by two dif-
ferent sub sequences (denoted by α and β) of elements 1. S = {α, β, β, α, β, α, β, β, α, α, β, α, .......},
where probability of α position is same with the probability of β position (pα = pβ) in the sequence
S. Information regarding the sub sequences α and β are shared between sender and receiver. Apart
from environmental noise these sub sequences of α and β can be further corrupted by two error-
introducing systems X and Y. Considering natural error, two different probabilistic error px and py
can be fixed by X and Y. For bit 0, sender introduces error px and py in the sub sequences α and
β respectively. Now sequence S can be termed as probabilistic sequence, Sp, where each element is
denoted by its error probability. Sp
0
= {px, py, py, px, py, px, py, py, px, px, py, px, ....} Simi-
larly, for bit 1, error px and py will be introduced in the sub sequences β and α respectively, then
Sp will be Sp
1
= {py, px, px, py, px, py, px, px, py, py, px, py, .....}.
The key will be:
K =


px py py px py px py py px px py px ....
py px px py px py px px py py px py ....
py px px py px py px px py py px py ....
px py py px py px py py px px py px ....
px py py px py px py py px px py px ....
py px px py px py px px py py px py ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . ....


≡


0
1
1
0
0
1
.
.
.


All rows (columns also) are having same error pz, where pz = 1/2(px + py). The receiver can
easily distinguish the bit values of the corrupted sequences as he knows the sub sequences α and β
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provided bits are statistically distinguishable. But code breaker has to go through the exhaustive
search as he/she does not know the sub sequences α and β. By exhaustive search code breaker can
find the two error levels px and py for two different sub sequences of α and β (statistical problem
of exact search is ignored). Once code breaker knows the position of α and β, he/she can easily
break the code. Of course code breaker can pursue the exhaustive search with marginal number
of bits. This will effectively reduce the number of search. Using the concept of pseudo-bit (fake
bit), we shall now discuss how to defeat the minimal exhaustive search.
Here S can be represented as a composition of three sub sequence of α, β and γ.
So S = {γ, γ, γ, γ, γ, α, β, γ, γ, γ, γ, γ, γ, β, α, γ, ....}, where pα = pβ, but less than pγ ,
the probability of γ position in the sequence of S. Similarly sender and receiver share the information
of the sub sequences α, β and γ. Apart from the devices X and Y, we need another error introducing
device Y which can produce error pz. Now error pz, px and py will be introduced in the sub
sequences γ, α and β respectively to represent bit 0 and error pz, py and px will be introduced in
the sub sequences γ, β and α respectively to represent bit 1, where pz = 1/2(px + py). Then the
extended key is:
KE =


pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ....
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ....
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ....
pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ....
pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz ....
pz pz pz pz pz py px pz pz pz pz pz px py pz pz ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....


≡


0
1
1
0
0
1
.
.
.


Again the probability of error in columns (also in rows) is same which is pz. Due to the presence
of pseudo-elements (position of γ), code breaker’s marginal statistics will have to be increased.
Increasing the number of pseudo-elements, we can force code breaker to pursue more lengthy
exhaustive search. As γ sub sequence is a pseudo sequence, receiver can only measure on α and β
sub sequences to reveal the bit values.
It is trivial to mention that single sequence S can be a binary sequence. Then a sequence of
binary sources will be corrupted in two different ways to produce two values. The error introduction
strategy is also applicable for quantum source. But measured error in quantum states is not
independent to measurements - it is a function measurement.
Let us assume pz = 1/2, px = 1/4 and py = 3/4 and the numbers of γ, α and β are 10
4, 102
and 102 respectively i.e. pγ : pα : pβ = 100 : 1 : 1. So code breaker’s minimum statistics for
exhaustive key search should be greater than 100. Therefore code breaker has to undertake more
than 2100 operations. The practical advantage of this system is that secure message can be directly
transmitted. As noisy apparatus is needed, secure communications might be economical.
3
Note added: Using the concept of ”pseudo-bit” and without using noise, a simple unbreakable
code has recently been proposed [4].
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